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Abstract 
Independent MPs have always determined formation of government in Solomon 
Islands. In an effort to limit the critical influence of independent MPs in forming 
governments, which has been a problem after almost all elections since 1974, the 
National Parliament of Solomon Islands debated and passed the Political Parties 
Integrity Act (PPIA) in 2014. The PPIA promises to limit the influence of 
independent MPs and prescribes how political parties are to be administered. It is 
also intended to establish fairer gender representation in Parliament. We noted with 
interest that most MPs who debated and passed the PPIA went on and contested as 
independent candidates. In this paper, we look at the 2014 and 2019 election results 
to assess the impacts, effectiveness, and weaknesses of the PPIA. We also explain 
why it may have failed, and highlight factors that determine voter behaviour, election 
outcomes, and government formation in the country. Lessons learnt from the 
loopholes and weaknesses of the PPIA and electoral politics more generally are then 
used to suggest ways forward for political party development, inclusiveness, 
integrity, and stability in Solomon Islands. 
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The Political Parties Integrity Act 2014 (PPIA) was passed by the Solomon Islands 
National Parliament in an attempt to encourage political stability. It has provisions to 
recognise female candidates and encourage them to contest elections, and describes 
how political parties are to be registered and administered. This paper relates the 
intentions of the PPIA, along with its effects and challenges, by specifically looking 
at the election results of 2014 and 2019. With the help of figures, we illustrate the 
composition and distribution of candidates by political party and by province 
following the passage and implementation of the PPIA. The election results for 2014 
and 2019, and the composition of coalitions that were subsequently formed are also 
highlighted. We use the data to highlight the weaknesses of the PPIA and explain 
factors that influence voter behaviour and determine election outcomes in the 
country. From lessons learnt, we propose certain approaches that could be pursued 
to strengthen political parties, encourage gender inclusion, and boost political 
stability in parliament. 
Characteristics of Electoral Politics and Government Formation in Solomon 
Islands 
Before we look at the PPIA and its provisions, it is important to provide the context 
and features of political parties, electoral politics, and government formation in the 
country. Political parties proliferate in Solomon Islands but most have short life 
spans, formed only in the lead up to elections. Some political parties that may be 
regarded currently active include the Solomon Islands United Party (SIUP), founded 
in the 1960 by Peter Kenilorea (Snr); the People’s Alliance Party (PAP), founded in 
1979 by Solomon Mamaloni and David Kausimae; the Solomon Islands Liberal 
Party (SILP), founded in 1988 by Bartholomew Ulufa’alu; the National Party (NP), 
founded in 1997 by Francis Billy Hilly; the Association of Independent Members of 
Parliament1 (AIMP), founded by Tommy Chan in 2001; the Solomon Islands 
Democratic Party (SIDP), founded by Mathew Wale in 2006; the Solomon Islands 
Party for Rural Advancement (SIPRA), founded in 2006 by Gordon Lilo and Dudley 
Tausinga; and the Ownership, Unity and Responsibility Party (OUR), founded by 
Manasseh Sogavare in 2019. Besides these active political parties, there are also 
those considered inactive but still in existence, such as the Autonomous Solomons 
                                                     
1 The Leader of Independent MPs is a constitutional post provided for under Chapter VI, Part 2, 
Section 66 of the Solomon Islands Independence Order, 1978. However, a formal association of 
independent MPs was formed in 2001 as an in-house group of MPs with no political party 
affiliation.  
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Party (ASP), founded by Dennis Lulei and Jackson Sunaone; the  Direct 
Development Party (DDP), founded by Dick Ha’amori and Alfred Sasako; the New 
Nations Solomon Islands Party (NNSIP), founded by Belani Tekulu; the Peoples 
Federation Party (PFP), founded by Rudolf Dorah and Clement Forau; the Peoples 
Power Action Party (PPAP), founded by Wales Feratelia; the Rural Congress 
Peoples Party (RCPP), founded by Milton Talasasa; the Reform Democratic Party of 
Solomon Islands (RDP), founded by Danny Phillips; and the Twelve Pillars to Peace 
and Prosperity Party (TPPPP), founded by Delmah Nori (see Alasia, 1997; Nanau, 
2010; NPSI, 2019). 
Most post-colonial political parties in Solomon Islands have similar intensions to 
improve citizen’s livelihoods, but only a handful of them strive to effectively regulate 
how they function to deliver services. The failure of parties to regulate themselves is 
demonstrated by frequent floor crossing (known locally as “grass hopping”) by MPs. 
Here, MPs freely move between political parties, often distorting the numerical 
balance of power in government and leading to increased votes of no confidence that 
characterise Solomon Islands post-colonial history. This “ever-changing series of 
political alignment” is what Steeves (2011, p. 345) calls “unbounded politics”.  As 
Baker (2019, p. 2) says, “the political party system remains weak and so alliances 
remain highly fluid and still largely personality rather than ideology-based”. Others 
also noted the affiliation of MPs being more towards their communities than 
anything national (Corbett & Wood, 2013; Nanau, 2010).  Under this logic, it may 
be concluded that governments are largely personality-based and have little to do 
with party policies and manifestos, a recipe for political instability in parliament. 
The outcomes of elections relate mostly to personal and kin connections and have 
little to do with party manifestos. Such an understanding is confirmed by the results 
of a survey carried out by RAMSI in 2011 on what is important to individual voters 
(see Table 1). These reasons remain the same for all elections since independence, 
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Table 1. Voters’ Reasons for Voting their Preferred Candidates. 
Reasons Male % Female % All % 
A good person. I like/trust him/her 38.3 30 34.1 
He/she made good promises 17 21.8 19.4 
He/she has done good work in my community 17 18.8 17.9 
Candidate is a good leader/good MP 23.8 11.3 17.5 
I think he/she will help people 15.5 18.3 16.9 
He/she is well educated 19.9 12.9 16.4 
He/she is from my family/tribe 9.9 12.5 11.2 
Church affiliation  9.1 5.0 7.0 
He/she has helped me/my family 5.8 7.1 6.4 
I was told to vote for him/her 3.9 5.9 4.9 
He/she is from my community/I know them well 4.6 4.7 4.7 
He/she gave me money or gifts 3.0 5.9 4.5 
Has money/good business person/owns a business 3.1 1.2 2.2 
I like that political party/policies 2.2 0.6 1.4 
Good vision for the country 1.9 0.7 1.3 
I thought he/she would win 1.2 0.8 1.0 
No details/other/wrong answer 0.9 0.3 0.6 
Don’t know 0.9 1.9 1.4 
Number of respondents 2128 2157 4284 
Source: ANU Enterprise, 2012 
As demonstrated in Table 1 above, the important considerations that usually 
determine the success of candidates in Solomon Islands elections include the 
following: (i) the popularity of and trust voters have in candidates; (ii) promises and 
actual tangible outputs previously delivered by the candidate to  the community; (iii) 
a good sitting MP; (iv) previous assistance to a voter’s family; (v) a member of the 
same Christian denomination; (vi) education level attained; and  (vii) the size of ones 
extended family and family affiliations  Political party policies and a vision for the 
country are very low considerations by voters, scoring only 1.4 per cent and 1.3 per 
cent respectively. Election outcomes and voter behaviour in Solomon Islands are 
very much influenced by the personal connections of individual candidates with 
voters, or what is commonly known as the wantok system in Melanesia (Nanau, 
2018). Apart from the personal connections of candidates, the influence of brokers 
(or campaign managers) and their own support bases often makes considerable 
difference between the winning candidates and others (Hiriasia, 2016, pp. 3-5). This 
is not peculiar to Solomon Islands, but is prevalent across Melanesia and other 
Pacific island countries (see Haley & Zubrinich, 2018; Wyeth, 2017; Cox et al., 
2007; Rich et al., 2007). The communal nature and close interpersonal relationships 
The Journal of Pacific Studies, Volume 40 Issue 2, 2020 27 
 
 
that people have with their kin and those who speak the same language or are from 
the same part of the island have implications in terms of goodwill and reciprocity.2 
As such, individuals and families would discuss and support candidates they closely 
associate with or who may have supported them in the immediate or distant past. It 
is common for families to split up and support two or more competing candidates 
depending on their individual, marriage, and even denominational connections.  
The chronic under-representation of women in Parliament is also a feature of 
Solomon Islands electoral politics. Again, this is not peculiar to Solomon Islands as 
it is also the case in most PICs. For instance, there are currently no female MPs in 
Vanuatu, PNG, or the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM); 1 in Tuvalu; 2 each in 
Nauru, and Marshall Islands; 3 each in Solomon Islands, and Tonga; 4 each in 
Tokelau, Palau, and Kiribati; 5 each in Niue, and Samoa; 6 in the Cook Islands; and 
10 in Fiji (PWP, 2020). In Solomon Islands, three female MPs in the 50-seat 
parliament reflect the patriarchal nature of its parliament, where important decisions 
affecting men, women, youths and children are made. In 2008, the government 
requested the Constituencies Boundaries Commission to look at the possibility of 
including ten reserved seats for women representing nine provinces and the Honiara 
Municipality, but this did not eventuate (Solomon Times, 20 March 2019). This has 
been criticised from various fronts and to date remains “unfinished” business. A 
UNDP report pointed out that “in the Solomon Islands, grassroots activism has not 
been sufficient to persuade (mostly male) legislators” (UNDP 2016, p. 2). One 
outgoing High Court Judge, Stephen Pallarus, during his farewell speech, also 
challenged leaders to recognise the role of women in society and suggested that 
“there should be one united organisation that could harness the energy, the 
intelligence, the anger and outrage of how women are treated in their own country” 
(SIBC, 15 November 2014). The Commonwealth Observer Group recommended in 
their 2019 report that the country adopt Temporary Special Measures (TSMs) to 
increase female representation in parliament. Two options suggested include the 
allocation of a quota of seats for women, and a relook at financial incentives for 
political parties fielding women candidates (The Commonwealth, 2019, p. 15). 
In recent years, the use of discretionary funds was blamed for skewed election 
outcomes in favour of sitting MPs and the nature of government coalitions formed. 
For instance, two issues cited during the 2019 election were cross-border3 
                                                     
2 For a detailed analysis on kin-based voting in Solomon Islands, see Tony Hiriasia’s (2016) study 
of East AreAre Constituency politics and voter behaviour.  
3 Cross-border registration and voting is where voters change their registration to vote in a different 
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registration and voting, and the use of Rural Constituency Development Fund 
(RCDF) to the advantage of sitting MPs (Wiltshire et. al., 2019). It is nevertheless 
important to re-emphasize the critical point raised earlier about constituency level 
voting that gifting is “embedded within kin-based social organisation and kin 
networking and that, on its own, gifting does not always bring about political loyalty, 
as often assumed” (Hiriasia, 2016, p. 3). What is being witnessed in Solomon Islands 
is a continuous contention between structure and agency. Much understanding and 
analysis of Solomon Islands elections revolves around structural approaches to 
addressing political instability with minimal attention on agential factors, including 
individual behaviour and attitude, experiences, background, or things such as the 
feelings of leaders in the country. Such structure-agential arguments are discussed in 
detail by scholars like Dinnen (2008) and Leftwich (2010). 
A former Solomon Islands Prime Minister, Rt. Hon. Ezekiel Alebua, observed that 
the main source of corruption in the 2019 election was the 2018 Electoral Act, 
describing it as either “ill conceived” or “intentionally drawn up” to allow sitting 
MPs to retain their seats (Asia Pacific Report, 15 April 2019). Money politics, either 
through business support from, say, logging companies or through MP contingency 
funds (although very difficult to prove), have always been regarded as influential in 
determining election outcomes and government formation in Solomon Islands and 
other Melanesian countries (Haley & Subrinich, 2018: Kabutaulaka, 2005). With the 
above context set, we will now turn to discuss legislative changes instituted in 2014 
aimed at encouraging stability and political party discipline. Perhaps the most 
significant attempt undertaken to encourage political stability in Solomon Islands’ 
parliament was the passing of the Political Parties Integrity Act, 2014 (PPIA). 
The Political Parties Integrity Act 2014 
The PPIA aims to encourage MPs to become members of registered political parties 
before and after elections and not remain as independents, a tendency assumed to 
encourage parliamentary instability because of limited political party affiliations. 
This Act was an attempt to encourage political parties to take root, become mass-
based, and, possibly, increase member loyalty. The PPIA prescribes criteria for 
political party registration, including how MPs are to be disciplined if they switch 
party allegiances, and how to strengthen the internal organisation of political parties. 
It also established a Political Party Commission to oversee the enactment of the Act 
                                                     
constituency where they do not reside with the hope of getting personal benefits from candidates. 
It was reported that in 2019, there were 54,000 instances of voters wanting to change their 
registration to a different constituency (see Wiltshire, et al, 2019).  
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and the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties responsible for administering the 
registration, amalgamation, and deregistration of political parties (NPSI, 2014). 
Certain provisions of the PPIA ought to be highlighted. First is the requirement that 
a candidate must be a registered voter and a member of a political party. This is an 
interesting provision because in practice an intending candidate can still contest as 
an independent candidate and only join a party after the election when s/he is 
declared the winner and/or before the formation of government. There is also a 
provision that attempts to encourage gender representation in elections. The 
provision states that at least 10 per cent of candidates who apply to contest under a 
party must be women. This is undermined by making the provision contingent on 
whether there are enough women applying under the party and subsequently 
endorsed as party candidates. To encourage female candidates, there is also a 
provision for a TSM grant that political parties that retain women MPs can claim 
after election results are declared. 
The PPIA, in its attempt to dissuade independent MPs, prescribe that an independent 
candidate must renounce his or her independent status and join a political party prior 
to or after the Oath of Allegiance is taken upon successful election. Once an MP 
renounces his/her independent status, s/he is deemed to be endorsed by that political 
party that s/he declares allegiance to. More importantly, no political party may enter 
into a coalition with any independent or group of independent MPs after elections. 
This is a controversial provision that may have also contributed to the demise of the 
PPIA. Nevertheless, the requirements for party registration appeared to reduce the 
number of political parties and independent groups that contested the 2014 election. 
Prior to the enactment of the PPIA, in the 2010 election, a total of twenty political 
parties contested, while in 2014 and 2019, only twelve and fourteen, respectively, 
contested the elections. Table 2 below provides the names of the political parties that 
contested the 2014 and 2019 elections. 
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Table 2. Registered and Non-registered Parties that Contested the 2014 & 2019 
Elections. 
Election Year 2014 2019 
Registered 
political parties 
1. People’s Alliance Party 
2. Democratic Alliance party 
3. People’s Progressive Party 
4. National Transformation 
Party  
5. Kadere   
6. Solomon Islands People 
First 
7. SIPRA  
8. United Democratic Party  
9. New Nation Party 
10. Pan-Melanesian Congress 
Party 
11. Direct Development Party 
12. Youth Owned Rural and 
Urban Party 
 
1. People’s Alliance Party  
2. Democratic Alliance Party 
3. Peoples Progressive Party  
4. National Transformation 
Party  
5. Kadere  
6. Solomon Islands People 
First 
7. SIPRA  
8. United Democratic Party  
9. New Nation Party  
10. Pan-Melanesian Congress 
Party 
11. Green Party  
12. Solomon Islands United 
Party 




1. OUR Party  
2. SI Democratic Party  
3. Liberal Party 
4. Labour Party 
5. Rural Urban Party 
6. United Party 
7. National Party 
1. OUR Party (registration 
completed after election). 
Source: SIBC, 2014 & 2019; SIEC, 2014 & 2019; ST, 2014 & 2019; NPSI, 2019 
We will now present the data in the form of tables of results from the 2014 and 2019 
elections and discuss key findings. It should be stated at the outset that the overall 
findings in the tables and discussions below is that, despite the PPIA, the 
characteristics discussed in the first section of the paper persist, especially in relation 
to the prominent role played by independent MPs, the continuing weakness of 
political parties, and the under-representation of women. Political instability and the 
unpredictable behaviour of independent MPs in government formation continued 
after the enactment of the PPIA. Indeed, independent MPs determined the final 
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composition of government coalitions following both the 2014 and 2019 elections. 
Notably, most MPs that debated and passed the PPIA went on and contested both the 
2014 and 2019 elections as independent candidates and not under political parties. 
They appear to have had little regard for the PPIA that they themselves passed to 
encourage political stability in parliament. On the contrary, loopholes and 
weaknesses inherent in the PPIA were exploited by individual MPs for political 
rewards. Some of these loopholes are discussed below. It is also important to point 
out that party affiliated MPs behave very similarly to independent MPs. They too 
frequently change sides. 
On gender equality, the PPIA provisions failed to encourage political parties to fulfil 
the 10 per cent provision even with the TSM inducement grant. In the 2014 election, 
only one female MP was elected to parliament, Hon. Freda Tuki Soriocomua, 
representing Temotu Vatud constituency. She contested on a People’s Alliance Party 
(PAP) ticket but when she got to parliament, she decided to switch allegiance to 
another political party. The TSM grant was never given to any political party because 
of that change in party loyalty. Later in the term of that particular house, an election 
petition unseated the then MP for Gizo/Kolombagara, Jimmy Tanangada, and a by-
election was subsequently held. His wife won the by-election and became the new 
MP for Gizo Kolombangara. Hon. Tuki and Lanelle Tanangada became the only two 
female MPs in that 10th Parliament. Unfortunately, Hon. Tuki lost her seat through 
an election petition and so only Hon. Lanelle Tanaganda completed the term of that 
Parliament. In 2019, both female MPs were re-elected and were each given 
ministerial portfolios. Hon. Tuki became the Minister for Women, Youth, Children 
and Family Affairs (MWYCFA) and Hon. Tanangada was appointed Minister for 
Police, National Security and Correctional Services (MPNSCS) only to resign 
following the government’s decision to switch diplomatic relationship from Taiwan 
to China. She was reappointed as the Minister for Education and Human Resources 
Development (MEHRD) during a cabinet reshuffle in April 2020 (Solomon Times, 
29 April 2020). In December 2019, a third female MP was elected into Parliament 
following a by-election in the East Makira constituency left vacant by the passing 
away of her husband and MP (RNZ, 2019b). Solomon Islands now have three female 
MPs in its 11th Parliament.  
Composition and Provincial Distribution of Candidates, 2014 and 2019 
Elections  
The number of registered political parties and candidates that contested the 2019 
general election increased slightly from those that contested in 2014. Nevertheless, 
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the results of both elections showed that a majority of those who won were 
independent candidates compared to those who contested under registered political 
parties. Indeed, this has been the case since 1974, even before independence, when 
the first coalition government was formed between some independents and the 
People’s Progressive Party (PPP) (Kabutaulaka, 2008, p. 106). Subsequent elections 
also indicated higher success rates for independent candidates than those who 
contested under registered political parties. For example, in the 2001 election, about 
40 per cent of successful candidates were independent MPs; 42 per cent in 2006; 42 
per cent in 2010; 64 per cent in 2014; and 42 per cent in 2019 (Nanau, 2010; SIEC, 
2019). 
The provincial distribution of political parties in both 2014 and 2019 elections render 
some insights into political culture and behaviour in the country. The 2014 election 
statistics show that 55.4 per cent of the 444 candidates who contested were 
independent candidates (Table 3) and 64 per cent of the seats on that election were 
secured by independent MPs. The relatively large political parties that contested in 
2014 were the United Democratic Party (7.9 per cent), People’s Alliance Party (7.4 
per cent), People First Party (5.4 per cent), and National Transformational Party (5.2 
per cent). The success rates for registered political parties in both 2014 and 2019 
elections were mixed. Tables 3 and 4 show the distribution of candidates as per 
province and political party/grouping. 
The domination of independent candidates in 2014 and 2019 raises many questions, 
as the group is not a formally registered political party under the PPIA. Independent 
MPs are required to join a political party after elections for purposes of forming a 
government, as only registered political parties are entitled to form government 
under the PPIA. This poses issues ranging from concerns about political party 
allegiance and commitment, to the constitutionally recognised position of the Leader 
of the Independent MPs in Parliament. As mentioned above, there continues to be a 
constitutional provision recognising a “Leader of the Independent group of MPs” 
and an associated office. 
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Table 3. Candidates as per Province and Party in 2014. 
Party IND DAP PAP PFP PPP UDP SIPRA KP DDP YRU NTP NNP PMC 
Choi 21 2 1 2       2  1 
West 25  6 2  7 4 2  1 4  1 
Isa 10 1 1 1  2  1  1    
Mala 79 7 7 8 2 7 4 10 1 4 7 2 6 
Centrl 15  2 1  2  2  1    
R&B 2 1    1      1  
Guale 35 1 6 6  8 1 2 1  3 2 5 
HIR 17  3 3  3 1   2 3 1 2 
MUP 20 1 4 2  3  2 1  1   
Temo 22  3 2 1 2 1 1  1 3  2 
Total 246 13 33 24 3 35 11 20 3 10 23 6 17 
Source: Wood, 2019; SIEC, 2019  
Table 4. Candidates as per Province and Party in 2019. 
Party IND SIUP DAP SIDP PAP PFP PPP UDP SIPRA KP GP PMC NTP NNP 
Choi 13 2 2 2 2 1 1        
West 17 3 2 3 2 3  3 1 1     
Isa 7  3  1   1  1 2    
Mala 43 12 6 6 7 5 1 5  4    1 
Centrl 12 1 1  1 1  1 1 2   1  
R&B 4  1  1          
Guale 20 4 2 6 1 1  2 2 1  2 1  
HIR 14 3 1 1 2 3  1 1   1 3 1 
MUP 17 2 4 2 2 2  3 3 2     
Temo 15 2 2 1 3 1  2 2 2 1  1  
Total 162 29 24 21 22 17 2 18 10 13 3 3 6 2 
Source: Wood, 2019; SIEC, 2019 
Government formation: 2014 and 2019 Coalitions 
Given the affiliation of candidates that contested the 2014 and 2019 elections, it is 
important to determine the success rates of these candidates under their respective 
groups and parties. Tables 5 and 6 below show the results of 2014 and 2019 elections 
for candidates that contested under registered political parties and those that 
contested as independents. It is obvious from the results that independent candidates 
were more successful in securing seats in both elections. 
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Table 5. 2014 Election Results. 
Political Party Seats secured Percentage (%) 
1. Democratic Alliance Party 7 14% 
2. United Democratic Party 5 10% 
3, People’s Alliance Party 3 6% 
4. Kadere Party of Solomon Islands 1 2% 
5. Solomon Islands People First 1 2% 
6. SI Party for Rural Advancement  1 2% 
7. Independents 32 64% 
Total 50 100% 
Source: IPU, 19 November 2014 
Table 6. 2019 Election Results. 
Political Party Seats secured Percentage (%) 
1. Kadere Party of SI 8 16% 
2. Solomon Islands Democratic Party 8 16% 
3. United Democratic Party 4 8% 
4. Democratic Alliance Party 3 6% 
5. People’s Alliance Party 2 4% 
6. SI United Party 2 4% 
7. SI Party for Rural Advancement 1 2% 
8. Solomon Islands People First 1 2% 
9. Independents 21 42% 
Total 50 100% 
Source: SIEC, 2019 
In the 2014 national general election, twelve registered and seven unregistered 
political parties contested (see Table 2). The majority of candidates that won seats in 
both 2014 and 2019 elections were independent candidates. Given the predominance 
of independent MPs compared to MPs affiliated to political parties in the 2019 
election, the government led by Prime Minister Sogavare again formed a coalition 
called the Democratic Coalition for Change Government (DCCG). The DCCG 
comprised six political parties (Solomon Islands Democratic Party, United 
Democratic Party, United Party, People’s Alliance Party, Peoples First, and Party for 
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Rural Advancement) and a seventh political party, OUR Party, which only completed 
its registration after the 2019 general election, bringing together all the independent 
MPs formally for the first time. Strictly speaking, most of them contested as 
independents but they did so under the unregistered party called OUR Party in both 
2014 and 2019. Unfortunately, the delayed registration of OUR Party and its pivotal 
role in forming a coalition after the 2019 election gave rise to a court challenge 
questioning the legitimacy of the registration of OUR party and the eligibility of Hon. 
Manasseh Sogavare’s nomination as the candidate for the prime minister’s position. 
It was ruled legitimate by the Solomon Islands High Court. 
Statistics on both the 2014 and 2019 elections show that a majority of incumbent 
MPs retained their seats. The public saw these as indicators of vote buying, where 
sitting MPs use funds from the RCDF and other sources to support their campaign 
effort. This is supported by the increased number of petition cases received by the 
High Court in 2019 totalling twenty-eight cases, more than half of all the 
parliamentary seats (RNZ, 2019a). There were only fifteen petition cases against 
winning candidates in 2014 (SIBC, 20 December 2018). This may be attributed to 
the differences in levels of public awareness carried out by the Electoral Commission 
Office in 2014 and 2019, and the improvement of judicial and policing services inter 
alia. Wood (2014, p. 1) explains that, although vote buying appears to be increasing, 
the sensitivity around this issue made it hard to quantify. Table 7 provides some 
comparative statistics on the 2014 and 2019 elections. 
Table 7. Summary of Important Comparative Statistics on the 2014 and 2019 
Elections. 
Election Year 2014 2019 
Number of seats in parliament 50 50 
Total number of candidates contested 443 333 
Number of male candidates 417 (94.1%) 307 (92.2%) 
Number of female candidates 26 (5.9%) 26 (7.8%) 
Number of registered parties contested 12 14 
Number of election petitions 15 28 
Number of parties winning seats 6 8 
Number of parties in government 2 7 
(including OUR Party) 
Source: The Commonwealth Observer Group, 2014; ERT & SPC, 2016; SIBC, 2018; 
SIEC, 2019 
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Why has the PPIA Failed to Achieve its Intended Objectives? 
There are a few loopholes or weaknesses of the PPIA and the processes that led to 
its adoption. They include, but are not limited to, the government’s piecemeal 
approach to addressing political instability, very weak provisions on gender equality 
and representation, limited impact on voter behaviour, and the fact that independent 
MPs have constitutional rights to form government. To start off, let us consider this 
point regarding independent MPs in parliament. The initial intension of the PPIA 
was to minimize or put a stop to “grass-hopper” politics, and part of the approach 
was to limit the influence of independent MPs by obligating all MPs to declare their 
allegiance to a registered political party before or after national elections. As 
highlighted throughout this paper, the role of independent MPs has been pivotal in 
the making and unmaking of governments in Solomon Islands. Independent MPs 
have been publicly criticised for their allegiance to a group that is not construed as a 
political party, but rather a group established to capitalise on the fluid political party 
system in the country. 
In 2014, Hon. Mathew Wale’s Solomon Islands Democratic Party (SIDP) sought 
legal clarification from the High Court, as they felt that some sections of the PPIA 
contravened the constitution, particularly their freedom of association. The High 
Court dismissed the case saying that the PPIA “does prescribe that an unregistered 
party cannot sign a coalition agreement with a registered party” (SIBC, 16 November 
2014). However, it allows MPs, including independents, to enter into Memorandums 
of Understanding or Agreements with other political parties in parliament to form 
government but not under the agreement prescribed by the PPIA (SIBC, 16 
November 2014). As the Commonwealth reported, “an important component of this 
agreement is that it must include provisions prescribing who the coalition may 
nominate as its candidate at the election of a new Prime Minister” (2014, p. 15).  Mr. 
Calvin Ziru, former Registrar of Political Parties further explained that “the act does 
not contravene the right or freedom of association of any individual and or political 
party and that political parties must be registered under the act in order for them to 
contest the elections” (Solomon Times, 17 November 2014). Herein lies a loophole 
of the PPIA. Alliances and associations are protected by the national constitution. 
However, an unregistered party cannot sign a coalition agreement with a registered 
political party under the PPIA, but they can form a “coalition with other unregistered 
parties or other independent MPs under a simple MOU or an agreement that is not 
the same as agreement prescribed by the Act” (SSN, 16 November 2014). The 2014 
ruling of the High Court also implied that independent MPs must join a political 
party in order to be able to participate in the governing of the country. Because of 
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this, the support of independent MPs can either encourage stability or instability 
during the process of forming coalitions. This is where the weakness and failure of 
the PPIA lie. 
A classic example was during the 2019 lobbying to form government. At that time, 
various political parties camped in different Honiara hotels. Two of the largest 
political parties, the Solomon Islands Democratic Party and the Kadere Party of 
Solomon Islands, only had 8 MPs each and therefore had to lobby for the support of 
the 21 independent MPs to form government.  This was further complicated when 
OUR Party only completed its registration process after the election results were 
officially declared. Following its official registration under the PPIA, most 
independent MPs, including Hon Manasseh Sogavare, formally declared their 
allegiance to OUR Party. The party leader Hon. Manasseh Sogavare was able to form 
the Democratic Coalition for Change (DCC) government with the subsequent 
support of most independent MPs. The opposition led by Hon. Matthew Wale 
questioned the validity of OUR party’s registration, and wanted the Governor 
General to delay the election of a new Prime Minister until a court decision was made 
on the case they filed. The Governor General decided instead to go ahead with the 
election of the Prime Minister and Hon. Manasseh Sogavare was duly elected while 
the opposition group walked out of Parliament without casting their votes. The High 
Court later struck out Hon. Wale’s case, but that was after sporadic riots and looting 
in East Honiara by disgruntled and ill-informed citizens (RNZ, 2019a). Hon. Wale 
rejected allegations that he fuelled the riots because of his group’s decision to walk 
away from the prime minister’s election and instead blamed it on Hon. Sogavare’s 
greed for power (ABC, 3 May 2019). In any case, independent MPs, although a loose 
group, not formally registered under the PPIA, wield the balance of power in the 
formation of governments. This has been the trend since independence in 1978. The 
PPIA failed to address this chronic cause of instability. 
Closely related is the fact that the PPIA was developed through a piecemeal rather 
than a holistic approach to address political instability. Since political instability is a 
national concern and a longstanding one, it should have been approached holistically, 
taking a more political settlement approach. Here political settlement refers to “a 
combination of power and institutions that is mutually compatible and also 
sustainable in terms of economic and political viability” (Khan, 2010, p. 4). The 
PPIA failed to do that and only focussed on parliamentary instability and the 
registration and administration of political parties. It did not address other aspects of 
instability, such as how to reduce election petitions, potential for riots, and other 
factors associated with frustrated voters who cannot get the change they wish to see. 
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Parliament has ignored the extensive consultations, research and analysis carried out 
by the constitutional reform committee that had been working on what may be 
regarded as a political settlement through the draft federal constitution. A loophole 
in the PPIA is that it attempts to address instability in Parliament while ignoring the 
wider implication of instability in society. The PPIA addresses the need for MPs to 
declare their allegiance to political parties but did little about the constitutional 
provision of the office of Leader of Independent MPs in Parliament as highlighted 
earlier. 
A holistic approach, taking into account the various forces that have contributed to 
political instability in the country, is critical, as government formation in Solomon 
Islands is influenced by the politics of individual interests and not so much by party 
ideologies and affiliations. Political ideologies that stemmed from different party 
manifestos only play a useful role in governance when the personal interests of 
candidates or MPs are reflected in them. In such a political climate, there is always 
a contention between individual interest and public interest. Attaining the common 
good for the Solomon Islands populace always appears unachievable despite large 
amounts of RCDF funds injected through government budgets and aid donors 
annually. 
The situation described may in part be attributed to the short time period since 
independence, when Solomon Islands had to adopt the Westminster parliamentary 
democracy, a system refined over centuries in the West. The challenges of 
introducing such a system of government in a country with more than 87 local 
languages and dialects (Bugotu et al., 1975, p. 12) spoken by hundreds of different 
tribes led one early leader of the country to express the notion that Solomon Islands 
was as “a nation conceived but never born” (Mamaloni, 1992, p. 14). The tensions 
between 1998 and 2003 contradicted efforts to unite this culturally and linguistically 
diverse country. As such, the PPIA failed to work towards a political compromise 
that would have been useful to engineer political party discipline and electoral 
stability in the country. As Craig and Porter suggested, “post-conflict political 
settlements, their compromises and combinations can develop out of ‘pacts’ between 
political and economic elites that, as they become institutionalised, provide a durable 
kind of stability and order” (2014, p. 1). Again, a weakness in the PPIA is its inability 
to accommodate the diverse aspects of instability in electoral politics and inability to 
work towards a political settlement instead of focussing entirely on political party 
registration and administration. 
Finally, the PPIA has very weak provisions on gender equality to wear down the 
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highly patriarchal nature of Solomon Islands society. Like other PICs, Solomon 
Islands will require more effort to change this cultural mind-set to pave the way for 
a more sympathetic and gender-sensitive approach to leadership. Since this requires 
cultural change, which is usually very slow change, it may be strategic to use 
legislation to incentivise or coerce voters to make their choices in a certain way that 
addresses gender equality in the political party and/or electoral system. As 
highlighted earlier, a prominent provision in the PPIA that attempts to address equal 
representation of women in parliament is the 10% provision for women contesting 
under political parties and the inducement grant on successful female candidates that 
contest under political parties. This is simply a percentage mentioned but it does not 
obligate political parties to set aside that percentage of spaces to female candidates 
since it goes on to say that only if there are enough women candidates applying to 
contest under the party. In a sense, this provision on gender equality is meaningless 
and does not have weight (Commonwealth, 2019). Examples of gender equality 
measures that work in the Pacific can be seen in French Polynesia, New Caledonia, 
Fiji, and Samoa (Baker, 2016). The PPIA could have learnt from experiences in other 
parts of the Pacific to strengthen gender equality provisions. 
Future Considerations for Improvement  
A possible way forward, given the fluidity of Solomon Islands’ political party 
system, would be to engineer ways that either induce or coerce voters, candidates, 
and MPs to adhere to certain political behaviour patterns that encourage stability and 
cooperation. There is still a need to strengthen political parties to make them more 
inclusive and attractive, such as requiring them to have a wider support base and 
offices with women and youth wings, and continuously recruiting members. If mass-
based political parties are not deemed feasible after careful study and 
experimentation, one other option is to coerce voters and political parties to adhere 
to certain standards of behaviour and operation through legislation (Nanau, 2015). 
Solomon Islands could learn from, say, Samoa, where a registered political party is 
only recognised if the party secures eight or more seats in an election. Moreover, in 
Samoa, independent MPs and those who resign from their political parties cannot be 
given ministerial portfolios in the entire life of that house.4 This is justified on the 
grounds that allowing political parties to control and discipline MPs or to cater for 
                                                     
4 We are conscious that the Samoan electoral law in this area led to the weakening of the opposition 
and have been regarded as “draconian” by external assessors. Nevertheless, it eliminated 
unnecessary frequent floor crossing and discouraged candidates from contesting as independents, a 
chronic challenge in Solomon Islands.    
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the 10 per cent provision for female candidates through inducements have so far been 
unsuccessful. As such, a more coercive approach engineered through the electoral 
system or political parties’ legislation may produce better outcomes and instigate 
change in voter behaviour. 
There is also the opportunity to stop, rethink, and develop a new electoral system 
that captures the nature and political culture of the Solomon Islands. In other words, 
there should be a search for a “political settlement” to address instability in the 
country. The basis for this new electoral system could be the lessons and experiences 
of the past four to five decades, taking on board lessons from other PICs. There are 
examples such as the Proportional Representation (PR) system used in Fiji, or the 
preferential and two-round systems of voting that require 50 per cent support from 
voters in a constituency before a candidate is declared a winner. An example of such 
a system is used in Kiribati. Of course, adopting and refining systems borrowed from 
other PICs would have to be contextualised to minimise potential negative impacts 
of such systems experienced elsewhere. It is important to stress that some provisions 
under the draft Federal Constitution of Solomon Islands, which defines 
representation and how elections are to be carried out, could be starting points 
(Nanau, 2017). For instance, under the draft federal constitution, there is a provision 
for “recall”, where an MP can be recalled by constituents if their MP is unable to 
fulfil his/her duties or is likely to bring disrepute to the constituency (SIG, 2018, pp. 
79-80). Political will and the ability to step away from the status quo to push for such 
reforms are essential requirements. 
Gender inequality, both in terms of candidates that contested and winners of both the 
2014 and 2019 elections, demonstrates there is an urgent need to address this issue 
in Solomon Islands national parliament. There is a gradual increase in the number of 
female candidates contesting elections over the years. For instance, in 2010, 25 
females (4.9 per cent) contested, in 2014, 26 (5.8 per cent) contested, and, in 2019, 
26 female candidates (7.8 per cent) contested. In the 2019 election, only 30 per cent 
of female candidates (8) contested as independents, while 69 per cent (18) 
campaigned under various registered political parties. Could this be an indication 
that female candidates have more faith in political parties than their male 
counterparts? The gender inequality gap between men and women’s participation in 
political leadership remains an outstanding issue to be addressed. In relative terms, 
women’s engagement in Solomon Islands politics is only six per cent5, and demands 
structural and behavioural changes to improve equal representation. The Solomon 
                                                     
5 In 2020, there are only 3 female MPs in the 50-seat parliament of Solomon Islands.  
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Islands Government should address this issue in the interest of stability and a fairer 
representation of genders in political leadership. 
Conclusion  
Overall, elections in Solomon Islands are relatively peaceful and well-respected by 
citizens. The general concern over the years is the acute level of instability in 
parliament caused by MPs frequently crossing the floor, toppling governments, or 
creating new ones. An attempt to address this under the PPIA proved ineffective in 
a country where personality politics determine the making and unmaking of 
governments. Independent MPs who command the balance of power during political 
lobbies in both 2014 and 2019 were testaments to the inherent weaknesses of the 
PPIA. Much more could be achieved through political party engineering to 
strengthen political party institutions and to encourage gender equality in Solomon 
Islands’ political processes. Positive experiences from other neighbouring countries 
could be adapted and contextualised to develop a more effective electoral system that 
will also encourage political stability without restricting the rights of representatives 
over leadership allegiances in parliament. This fine line between a re-engineered 
electoral system and democratic freedom of MPs to freely decide on allegiances is 
the most difficult but essential puzzle to solve in Solomon Islands. Little has changed 
in the behaviour of voters, political parties, and how coalitions are formed since 
independence, despite allegations of influence and pressures from loggers on 
politicians since the 1980s or the 2019 diplomatic switch from Taiwan to China. Now 
is probably the opportune time to reflect on the lessons learnt so far, to rethink what 
is best for the country and to forge a new electoral system that institutionalises 
political parties, addresses gender inequality, and ensures political stability for 
governments to deliver services. 
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